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Insurance-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
Robert N. Covington*
I. SELECTION AND CONTROL OF RISKS

A. Definitionof Insured in Group Policy
B. Definitionof the Insured Event
C. Interpretationof Exclusions in Liability Policy
D. FailureTo Fulfill Occupancy Condition
II. SERIWCING ThE POLICY-BREACH OF COOPERATON CLAUSE IN LLrMnrrx
POLICY

The Tennessee decisions in the field of insurance law during the survey
period dealt almost exclusively with problems that may be characterized
as the selection and control of risks. The importance of the principles used
in the solution of these problems is obvious. Only by being able to select
carefully those risks for which insurance will be offered can the insurer
properly determine the premium that is to be charged. If policy language
is interpreted to grant broader coverage than that actually intended, then
the insurance fund is subjected to greater potential loss than estimated,
so that the insurer's profits will be eliminated or reduced; on the other
hand an unfairly narrow interpretation will mean that the insurer has
received premiums for little or no protection. In the latter situation it may,
of course, be possible that some adjustment may be made regarding the
return of premiums paid.'
I. SELECTON AND CONTROL OF RISKS

A. Definition of Insured in Group Policy
2
The policy involved in Boyd v. Peoples Protective Life Insurance Co.
insured the lives of the named insured (in this case the father) and '%is

wife and unmarried children (including stepchildren and legally adopted
children) under 19 years of age who live in his household."3 At the time
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Vanderbilt Law
Review.
1. See generally PATTERSON, EssENTLs OF INSURANCE LAW 226-30, 347-49 (2d ed.

1957).
2. 345 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. 1961).
3. 345 S.W.2d at 871. The policy also contained a clause restating the coverage in
slightly different terms: "If a child becomes married, reaches his or her 19th birthday,
or moves away from the Insured's household, the insurance on that child will cease."

Ibid.
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the policy was issued, the named insured's son Roy was living at home
with his father. Soon afterwards, however, Roy was adjudged a juvenile
delinquent and committed for an indefinite term to the State Vocational
School for Boys at Jordonia. Roy attempted to escape from Jordonia and
during his abortive attempt was shot and killed. Defendant insurer
declined to pay benefits and named insured sued. After a verdict for the
plaintiff was returned by the jury, the trial judge sustained a motion for
new trial by the insurer and entered judgment for the defendant on the
ground that Roy was not covered by the terms of the policy. On appeal,
the court of appeals reversed, but by the instant decision the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial judge's
action.
At issue, in the court's view, was whether under any reasonable interpretation Roy, although confined in Jordonia, could be considered as living
in the insured's household. The court answered in the negative.
At first blush, this seems the only possible resolution. Plaintiff, however,
was able to build a forceful case by pointing out the numerous meanings
that have been ascribed to the term "household" in various contexts. Thus
the term may refer to a family,4 to a residence,5 or to a group of persons
living together under one roof. 6 This meaning, modified by the addition
of the words "under one head and under the common control of one
person"7 is the meaning adopted by the court as the only reasonable construction of the term as used in the instant policy. In formulating this
definition the court seems to have been influenced by the fact that the
policy apparently does not employ "household" and "family" in apposition
but rather uses the term household as a limitation on the word family.
The court cites an Alabama decision to this effect8
It must be pointed out that this construction of the policy does not
require the actual physical presence of the child or spouse in the father's
abode on the date of death. Those temporarily absent from the dwelling
place are to be deemed covered so long as they still remain under the
father's dominion and control, a control which had been abrogated in this
instance by court order 9 Thus, some latitude of interpretation remains
under these policies. Moreover, the court's definition is itself not entirely
4. E.g., Allen v. Multnomah County, 179 Ore. 548, 173 P.2d 475, 477 (1946).
5. E.g., Appeal of Hoopes, 60 Pa. 220, 222 (1869).

6. E.g., People v. Whitted, 124 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (New York City Magis. Ct. 1953).
7. 345 S.W.2d at 872.
8. McGrady v. Liberty Natl Life Ins. Co., 40 Ala. App. 390, 114 So. 2d 324
(1959). In this case the court said: "The use of 'family and 'household' in the same
sentence in defining who . . .is insured shows a difference in meaning of the two
words." 114 So. 2d at 324-25.
9. The court places great emphasis on the factor of the father's lack of dominion.
Query, what would be the effect of emancipation if a child under 19 returned to
live in the same dwelling with his parents? See 345 S.W.2d at 873.
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free from ambiguity, for the phrase "living together" has been broadly
interpreted in an adjoining jurisdiction. 10
B. Definitionof the Insured Event
Beeler v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Insurance Co." involves
the definition of the word "automobile" appearing in the coverage clause
of an automobile policy. Defendant insurer had issued a policy providing
medical coverage up to $2,000 for a member of the insured's family for
injuries accidentally sustained "while occupying or being struck by an
automobile."' 2 Plaintiff, a member of insured's family, was accidentally
injured while operating a motorcycle. She submitted a claim for medical
expenses to the defendant who refused to pay them on the ground that
the motorcycle did not fall within the category of automobile. Plaintiff
thereupon brought this action, which was dismissed by the trial court. On
appeal to the court of appeals for the eastern section, held, affirmed.
The great majority of American jurisdictions which have passed on the
matter have held that motorcycles are not automobiles within the meaning
of these policies.' 3

In the instant case, however, there was a complicating factor which
plaintiff maintained indicated that the word automobile was used in a
very broad sense in this policy. This factor was the presence of an
exclusionary clause: "This policy does not apply ...

to bodily injury ...

while occupying or being struck by a vehicle operated on rails or crawlertreads or a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally
off public roads, while not upon public roads." The plaintiff's argument
was that this listing of excluded vehicles should be taken to mean that
all other vehicles are included in the category of automobile. The argument
possessed special force because of a relatively recent decision by the
Tennessee Supreme Court that a one-half ton pickup truck was included
within the term "a private passenger automobile of the pleasure car
type," a conclusion reached because of a clause stating that the term
automobile should not include motorcycles or airplanes. 14 Applying the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court in that case held that
10. Thus under a similar policy insuring "any of the following persons residing
together as one family" and naming deceased and his mother, the fact that deceased
was killed while serving with the armed forces in Holland while his mother was in
Mississippi was held not to preclude recovery. Residing together does not mean living
at the same place. Mississippi Benefit Ass'n v. Majure, 201 Miss. 183, 29 So. 2d 110
(1947).
11. 346 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
12. Id. at 458.
13. See, e.g., Moore v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 162 Tenn. 682, 40 S.W.2d 403, 405
(1931); 4 Woans & PEmASEs 856-57 (1940); see also PATrEnsoN, EssENTIA.S oF
IN URANCE LAW 488 (2d ed. 1957).
14. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell, 192 Tenn. 627, 241 S.W.2d 595 (1951).
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had the insurer intended to exclude any vehicles other than airplanes or.
motorcycles from the policy, it should have listed them in the same
clause. "[T]hat which is expressed, puts an end to that which is implied." 15
In the instant case, the court held that the earlier case was not controlling. It noted that the maxim involved was merely an aid in construction, applicable in limited types of situation. "It should not be used," in
the words of Judge McAmis, "to create an ambiguity, or to contradict a
clear expression of intent .... "-16 Moreover, in the earlier case, the clause
which excluded airplanes and motorcycles was a clause whose function
was to define the word automobile, while in the instant case, the clause
involved is simply one stating a condition of coverage, focusing not so
much on the definition of the term automobile as on the type of activity
being engaged in by the insured. 17 On the whole, the decision seems a
just one, even in face of the usual principles applied when dealing with
contracts of adhesion.
C. Interpretationof Exclusions in Liability Policy
The defendant insurer in Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.18
issued a policy of liability insurance to plaintiff by which it agreed to
indemnify plaintiff for damage he caused to the property of others while
engaged in his work as a contractor. The policy contained a clause, however, excluding liability for injury to "property in the care, custody or
control of the insured or property as to which the injured [sic] for any
purpose is exercising physical control ..... 19
In May 1958 plaintiff undertook to rewire a number of motors which
were used to power printing presses. These motors were bolted to the
presses, but someone-either plaintiff, one of his employees or one of the
printing company's employees-before working on each motor, would
loosen the power transmission belt which would activate the press when
the motor was turned on. In the case of one motor, the workers failed to
do this and when plaintiff turned on the motor to check his work, the
press began to work and was damaged. Plaintiff sought by this action to
compel defendant insurer to pay the repair costs which plaintiff bore as a
result, alleging that the damaged press did not fall within the exclusion
on which insurer relied. Plaintiff's theory was that the only property in
his control was the motor, and that any control he might have had over
the press was purely incidental so that damage to it would fall within the
limits of the policy's coverage. 20 The chancellor below ruled against
15. 241 S.W.2d at 596.
16. 346 S.W.2d at 459.
17. Ibid.
18. 348 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).

19. Id. at 513.
20. The court does not in so many words accept the thesis that property which is
only incidental to a contractor's work does not fall within such an exclusion, but this

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 15

plaintiff, holding that even if employees of the printing firm were present
and disconnected the presses in each case rather than allowing plaintiff's
employees to do it, plaintiff still had control over the press, no doubt
because these employees would be "borrowed servants" within the meaning
of that agency concept. The court of appeals for the middle section
affirmed in a well documented opinion.
The decision seems to be a correct one. The apparent rationale of this
exclusion would seem to be that the insured is to be indemnified only for
incidental damage resulting from the acts of his employees and himself,
not for shoddy or negligent accomplishment of the particular work for
which he was hired and in which he supposedly is expert. This is to say
that this is not a policy warranting plaintiff's care and skill in his trade,
but rather one which protects him against damage which he may do to
property of his employers other than that on which he is working. Since
in this case plaintiff insured may properly be viewed as having been
hired to put the presses in running order, and since the motors were
physically bound to the presses, damage to these presses could legitimately
be found by a trier of fact to fall within the quoted exclusion.
D. FailureTo Fulfill Occupancy Condition
Cashen v. Camden Fire Insurance Ass'n2 ' called for a construction of the
conditional clause in the standard fire policy calling for suspension of
coverage "while a described building, whether intended for occupancy
by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty
consecutive days." The policies in the case were issued to the plaintiff
insureds to cover a building and equipment which were used for restaurant
purposes, being so described in the policies. The restaurant was padlocked
during the life of the policy. A month after the padlocking, which was
reported in a news article in a local newspaper, one of the plaintiffs made
a premium payment to the defendant insured's local agent. During the
months after the padlocking, one of the insureds stored tools in the
building, and visited the structure almost daily to obtain and use these
tools. One hundred thirteen days after the padlocking, the building burned,
causing the loss for which plaintiffs now sue. The defendant declined to
indemnify because of an alleged violation of the suspensive condition
relating to occupancy.
Plaintiffs met this defense with a double-barrelled attack. First, they
argued the building was not unoccupied, since tools were being stored
in it and frequent visits were being made. Second, the defendant is said
to have waived the suspension by accepting premium payments after
the padlocking when it should be charged with knowledge of this situation
is no doubt implied. For a discussion of various views on the breadth of this exclusion,
see APpLEmq,
INsuRANCE LAW AN PRAcTC E § 4493.4 (rev. vol. 1962).
21. 348 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
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because of the article in the newspaper. In the trial court, the jury returned
verdicts for the plaintiffs, but in the court of appeals for the eastern section this decision was reversed and the cases were ordered dismissed.
The court disposed of plaintiffs' first argument by saying that since the
policies described the property involved as being used for restaurant
purposes, the unoccupancy clause should be construed with this in mind.
Thus storing tools-although it might prevent the building from being
"vacant" in the conventional sense-did not mean that the structure was
"occupied" for it was not being occupied as a restaurant or similar commercial enterprise. This construction is eminently reasonable. As the
most recent edition of Vance on Insurance puts it:
[I]t is apparent at the outset that buildings designed for different purposes
are susceptible of occupancy in very different degrees. . . Therefore the
condition requiring that the property shall be occupied, and not vacant,
will be construed reasonably, with reference to what must have been the
intention of the parties, in view of the character of the building2 2
Plaintiffs' second argument called for a somewhat more extended discussion. Under Tennessee law2 2 it would be true that if the local agent
had sufficient knowledge concerning the breach of the unoccupancy clause,
his acceptance of the premium might well lead to a finding of waiver. In
this case, however, the court held that the single newspaper article reporting the padlocking was not enough to support a finding of knowledge
when the premium was accepted. The fact that the agent read the article
at the time is not conclusive, for he did not receive the premium until a
month later. The agent was not to be charged with knowledge that the
padlocking continued until this time. In view of the circumstances, this
seems reasonable, for when the premium was paid, the agent could have
been told of the continued padlocking. This is particularly relevant since
each policy contained a provision requiring the insured to request a nonoccupancy permit if one was desired. 4
Poucy-BREAcH OF COOPEAxTION CLAUSE IN
LiABmrry PoucY
Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gean2 5 presented to the Supreme Court
of Tennessee another situation involving the thorny problem of whether or
not an insured is to be deprived of the benefits of a liability policy because
of failure to cooperate with the insurance company in the defense of an
action against him. Insured was sued by the plaintiff in this action for
II. SmvIcING aTo

22.

VANCE, INSuRANcE

858 (3d ed. 1951).

23. See Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. King, 137 Tenn. 685, 701-02, 195 S.W. 585, 589
(1917).
24. 348 S.W.2d at 887.
25. 346 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1961).
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personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred while
she (plaintiff) was a guest in insured's car. During the pendency of the
action insured met with the attorneys retained by the insurance company,
went over the case with them, and apparently did all that was asked of
him. On the day of trial, however, insured failed to appear in court. The
attorney located him in a town about one hundred ten miles away, and
learned that he had confused the date of the trial. They asked him if he
could not leave work there and come to the trial immediately, but he
replied that he could not since he had no car available to him. The attorneys retained by the insurer thereupon returned to the courtroom, informed the judge of the situation, and stated that they were withdrawing
from the case because of this failure to cooperate. The judge asked if it
would not be possible to get the insured to court by 1:00 P.M., which was
some two and one-half hours away, indicating that he would be willing
to postpone the trial until then. The attorneys replied that insured had
indicated this would not be possible. The trial continued, a verdict against
insured resulted. Insured then retained his own attorney and moved for a
new trial, but this was overruled. Plaintiff attempted to obtain execution
against the insured, but the writ was returned nulla bona, and now plaintiff
brings this action against the insurer.
Below, the chancellor held that since the insured had failed to fulfill the
condition precedent of cooperation, plaintiff could not recover. The court
of appeals reversed, and by this decision the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the reversal.
The court's reasoning is that the insurer did not go far enough in attempting to obtain the insured's presence and testimony. Within the
period of the suggested postponement the court proposes, it would have
been possible for the insured to travel the distance involved by cab, or
perhaps by borrowing an automobile. By failing to phone the insured
back, to tell him of this possibility, and by failing to offer to aid insured
in finding transportation, the insurer was remiss.
It is a bit difficult to tell from the court's language whether its conclusion was that since insured's mistake about the date of trial was honest
and innocent he had substantially complied with the cooperation clause,
or whether the court felt that by failing to inform insured of the alternatives open to him and trying to find transportation for him the company
waived this defense or was estopped from asserting it.

